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Top Secret

SENSITIVE



Intelligence Memorandum

Background Maps for Use in Considering Cease-fire Questions

(Prepared with the Assistance of the Defense Intelligence Agency)

NSA Declassification/Release Instructions on File.



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 18 November 1972

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Background Maps for Use In Considering Cease-fire Questions

- 1. Under separate cover, the recipients of this memorandum are being provided with five maps of South Vietnam. These maps are intended to be analytic tools which may be useful in clarifying questions relating to an in-place cease-fire. As instructed, we have put no classification on any of these maps. In the explanatory comments to each map (set forth below) we indicate the actual level of classification of the information thereon.
 - 2. The maps are identified by number, as follows:
- MAP NO. 1: Disposition and Strength of Friendly and Enemy Ground Combat Main Forces in South Vietnam as of Mid-November 1972. As the legend on this map indicates, all Communist main-force regiments in South Vietnam are shown as red circles, and RVNAF main force regiments are shown as blue circles. Infantry, artillery, and armored regiments of both sides are included. For the RVNAF, all Airborne, Marine and Ranger regimental equivalents are also included. In addition, the South Korean forces in South Vietnam's MR2 are shown on the map. The few NVA antiaircraft artillery units in South Vietnam are excluded, however, as are RVNAF air force (and naval) units. regional and local forces of both sides are also omitted, although on the GVN side they constitute a considerable portion of total friendly strength. In

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depicting the degree to which individual regiments are understrength, we have used the latest intelligence available from the field.* It should be pointed out that NVA regiments even at full strength are smaller than ARVN regiments, while on the RVNAF side there are also variations in the size and organization of ARVN, Marine, Airborne and Ranger regiments or regiment equivalents. Nevertheless, the size of the circles accurately portrays the general strengths of the contending forces in any area. The classification of this map would normally be SECRET SPOKE, since much of the information on which it is based is derived from airborne radio direction finding.

- MAP NO. 2 Disposition and Strength of RVNAF Ground Combat Main Forces.
 - This map contains exactly the same information on RVNAF as does Map No. 1, but it omits all information concerning enemy forces. In areas where Map No. 1 is cluttered and difficult to read because there are large numbers of friendly and enemy units in close proximity to each other, this map presents a clearer picture of the disposition of friendly main forces. The classification of this map would normally be SECRET NOFORN.
- MAP NO. 3

 Disposition and Strength of Communist
 Ground Combat Main Forces.

 This map portrays only the enemy's ground combat main forces in South Vietnam, and presents exactly the same picture of the enemy's forces as does Map No. 1. Once again, the reason for this map is simply that it presents a clearer picture of enemy forces in those areas where Map No. 1 is cluttered. The classification of this map would normally be SECRET SPOKE.

^{*}All the order-of-battle information on this map, including the estimates of the strength of individual regiments, represents the coordinated judgments of CIA and DIA.

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MAP NO. 4 Hamlets under Physical Control of the Communists in South Vietnam as of 30 September 1972.

The red dots on the map show the location of all "V" hamlets (those wholly controlled by the Communists) as rated by the HES at the end of September 1972. The October HES data is not yet available in sufficient detail to be included on the maps. a sense, the September data may reflect the current situation more accurately than would the October data, since the abortive Communist "highpoint" in late October led to a temporary deterioration in the HES standing of some hamlets. By mid-November, the situation was probably back roughly to the end-September level. Because of the inclusion of HES data in this map, it would normally be classified CONFIDENTIAL.

MAP NO. 5 Populated Areas of South Vietnam Where the GVN has no control as of Mid-November 1972 and is not Actively Contesting for Control. The areas which are shaded in red on this map meet three criteria: (1) they contain a significant population, (2) there is a significant NVA or Viet Cong military or administrative presence in the area, and (3) the GVN has no significant presence in the area and its military forces are not actively contesting for control of the area as of mid-November 1972. None of the areas which are presently being fought over, such as the territory around An Loc or immediately to the west and north of Quang Tri City, are included in the red shading, although there are many hamlets in these areas which are carried by the HES as Viet Cong-controlled. Furthermore, none of the areas of South Vietnam which are sparsely populated are included--unless enemy military forces are present--even

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though in much of this unpopulated territory the GVN also has no meaningful presence. In short, the areas which are shaded red probably represent the minimum amount of South Vietnamese territory which the U.S. and the GVN would have to concede, on a de facto basis, to Communist administration under a settlement agreement similar to that now under discussion. This map is UNCLASSIFIED.

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